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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington courts often quote the maxim "equity abhors a
forfeiture."1 Yet the courts' treatment of a defaulting buyer
under a land installment contract contradicts these words. When
a land installment contract includes a forfeiture provision,'
Washington courts generally limit the defaulting buyer's equita-
ble remedy to a "grace period." During the grace period,' a
defaulting buyer may be able to reinstate the contract by bring-
ing the payments up to date, but the contract is forfeited if the
grace period expires before the buyer performs.5 Upon forfeiture,
1. See, e.g., Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 904, 297 P.2d 605, 607 (1956) (court
granted a thirty-day grace period when the equities arose in the contract vendee's favor:
he had paid 68% of the contract price, had made improvements beyond those for which
he had been compensated, had tendered the balance due upon notice of forfeiture, and
seller had accepted a tax payment from buyer after expiration of the forfeiture notice);
Batchelor v. Madison Park Corp., 25 Wash. 2d 907, 917, 172 P.2d 268, 274 (1946) (forfei-
ture avoided because only the state can maintain a suit to forfeit rights granted by the
state to a city).
2. Forfeiture clauses allow a seller, upon a buyer's default, to declare the contract
forfeited, to repossess the property, and to retain all previous payments from the buyer
as liquidated damages. Forfeiture clauses are used extensively in land installment con-
tracts. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.25, at 80
(1979) [hereinafter cited as G. OSBORNE].
3. By granting a grace period, the court defers the forfeiture and allows the default-
ing buyer a period of time during which the buyer can comply with the contract terms
and avoid forfeiture. Courts weigh certain factors in deciding to offer grace periods.
These factors include substantial payments, improvements, attempts to pay delinquen-
cies, and the size of the delinquency compared to the buyer's equity. Moeller v. Good
Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 784, 215 P.2d 425, 429 (1950) (because the equities
of the case warranted the remedy, purchaser was granted a sixty-day grace period to
avoid the hardship that would result from strict enforcement of a forfeiture provision).
See Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 905, 297 P.2d 605, 608 (1956). Courts will not
grant a grace period, however, when there is little hope of future payments. See, e.g.,
Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d 571, 574-75, 358 P.2d 550, 552 (1961) (the court
distinguished other cases in which it was not clear that the purchaser could make future
payments, and granted a grace period because the purchaser offered to pay the full con-
tract price plus all costs).
4. See, e.g., Knoblauch v. Sanstrom, 37 Wash. 2d 266, 268, 223 P.2d 462, 463 (1950)
(five-day grace period); Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 784, 215
P.2d 425, 429 (1950) (thirty-day grace period, the customary time allotted); Barrett v.
Bartlett, 189 Wash. 482, 484, 65 P.2d 1279, 1280 (1937) (ten-day grace period).
5. See, e.g., Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 904-05, 297 P.2d 605, 608 (1956);
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the seller retains all prior installment payments and repossesses
the property regardless of the seller's actual loss.' The buyer
loses the entire investment. 7
The Washington courts' reliance on grace periods stems
from their refusal to order foreclosure by judicial sale8 if the
land installment contract includes a forfeiture clause.9 This was
not always the case. Early Washington courts declined to
enforce forfeiture provisions that constituted penalties rather
than provisions for liquidated damages.10 Nonetheless, this
treatment of forfeiture clauses in land installment contracts sub-
sequently lost favor with the Washington courts.1 As a result,
grace periods remain the sole equitable remedy in Washington
for defaulting buyers under land installment contracts contain-
ing forfeiture clauses.
Washington courts should reinstate foreclosure by judicial
sale as an equitable remedy for a defaulting buyer because grace
periods often fail to relieve the harsh results of forfeiture when
the buyer has a large equity in the contracted property.12 A two-
Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 783, 215 P.2d 425, 429 (1950).
6. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.75, at 188 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
7. Id.
8. Foreclosure by judicial sale allows the court to foreclose the contract as though it
were a mortgage, according to statutory requirements. This means that the property is
sold to satisfy the debt and the costs of the proceedings. Any excess from the sale is paid
to the buyer. Id. § 11.74, at 186-87. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 61.12 (1983) controls forfeiture
procedures. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
9. See Rains v. Lewis, 20 Wash. App. 117, 122, 579 P.2d 980, 983 (1978) (when pur-
chaser failed to tender payment in full by the end of the grace period, the forfeiture
provision was enforced). See also First Nat'l Bank of Everett v. Tiffany, 40 Wash. 2d
193, 200, 242 P.2d 169, 173 (1952) (court ordered foreclosure because the contract was
subject to an existing mortgage, but also noted that it would not foreclose a contract
with a forfeiture clause as a mortgage).
10. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Gowey, 30 Wash. 412, 426, 71 P. 12, 17 (1902) (stipulated
damages are penalties, not liquidated damages, if the stipulated sum is punitive rather
than compensation for damages actually sustained). See also Everett Land Co. v. Maney,
16 Wash. 552, 557-58, 48 P. '243, 244 (1897) (court granted the relief as liquidated dam-
ages, but explained that it would not enforce any provision for liquidated damages, even
if some of the required performance could not be measured by a pecuniary standard, as
long as the damages could be ascertained by a jury); Krutz v. Robbins, 12 Wash. 7, 10-14,
40 P. 415, 416-17 (1895) (court refused to enforce any provision for liquidated damages if
enforcement would create a penalty, or when the damages were ascertainable).
However, many early Washington cases did not distinguish between earnest money
contracts and land installment contracts. See, e.g., Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75
Wash. 490, 135 P. 240 (1913); Johnson v. Cook, 24 Wash. 474, 64 P. 729 (1901); St. Paul
and Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Bolton, 5 Wash. 763, 32 P. 787 (1893); Shelton v. Jones, 4
Wash. 692, 30 P. 1061 (1892).
11. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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step approach is needed when dealing with defaulting buyers
under a land installment contract that contains a forfeiture pro-
vision. First, the court should apply a liquidated damages analy-
sis to the forfeiture clause and refuse to enforce the provision if
a forfeiture would result in a disproportionate loss to the
defaulting buyer. 13 Second, the court should order foreclosure by
judicial sale as an equitable remedy if the forfeiture acts as a
penalty, rather than as compensation for the seller's actual
loss. 14
This Comment will trace the history of the Washington
courts' decision to deny foreclosure by judicial sale in land
installment contracts with forfeiture clauses and will demon-
strate the viability and preferability of foreclosure by judicial
sale as an equitable remedy for a defaulting buyer. The Com-
ment will also describe how other states, either legislatively or
judicially, have resolved the inequity of forfeitures.
II. THE HISTORICAL REJECTION OF FORECLOSURE UNDER
FORFEITURE CLAUSES
Early Washington courts allowed equitable foreclosure of
installment contracts by judicial sale on the theory that the
seller's retained legal title acted as security for the debt and,
thus, created an equitable mortgage.' Courts often treated a
forfeiture clause in a land installment contract as a provision for
liquidated damages."8 If the buyer's loss considerably exceeded
the seller's loss, the courts held that forfeiture acted as a penalty
13. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.26. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226,
233-34, 301 N.E.2d 641, 644-46 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974) (forfeiture provi-
sion acted as a penalty and was unenforceable).
14. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 234-41, 301 N.E.2d 641, 646-50
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
15. See St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Bolton, 5 Wash. 763, 766, 32 P. 787, 788
(1893) (the parties' equitable rights under the bond contract were the same as those
under a mortgage); Shelton v. Jones, 4 Wash. 692, 697, 30 P. 1061, 1062 (1892) (although
the court found no vendor's lien in favor of the seller, the court determined that the
seller retained a security interest, upon which the seller could foreclose).
16. For detailed discussions of the analysis applied when determining whether a for-
feiture constitutes liquidated damages, see McDaniels v. Gowey, 30 Wash. 412, 424-29,
71 P. 12, 17 (1902) (contract damages are simple mathematical computations; thus, stip-
ulated sums are usually penalties under these circumstances); Johnson v. Cook, 24 Wash.
474, 478-80, 64 P. 729, 731 (1901) (forfeiture of a stipulated sum for failure to erect a
house on mortgaged property was not enforced because the forfeiture acted as a penalty,
not as liquidated damages; the stipulated sum was a penalty because the actual damages
were capable of accurate determination).
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and refused to enforce the forfeiture. 17 Instead, the courts
ordered the property foreclosed by judicial sale and limited the
seller's recovery to the amount of the debt owed, plus any dam-
ages resulting from the default."5
In Pease v. Baxter,"' decided in 1895, the Washington
Supreme Court held that forfeiture provisions destroyed any
possible application of the equitable mortgage theory, which
allowed for foreclosure by judicial sale.2 0 The rationale was that,
by construing the contract as an equitable mortgage and by
ordering foreclosure through judicial sale, the courts were "flatly
contradicting the express terms of the contract itself."2' The
court held that a forfeiture clause created a contract of condi-
tional sale, rather than an equitable mortgage.2 2 Thus, the Pease
court, without a clear explanation, dropped any reference to the
liquidated damages analysis8  and set the stage for removing
equitable foreclosure as a remedy when a buyer defaults on a
land installment contract containing a forfeiture clause.
In Pease, Justice Dunbar relied upon his opinion in Reddish
v. Smith 4 as the basis for the court's decision that a land
installment contract with a forfeiture clause could not be fore-
closed as an equitable mortgage, but must be forfeited as a con-
tract of conditional sale.25 Justice Dunbar dismissed objections
to his reliance on Reddish by stating merely that "the equitable
interests of the vendee [buyer] were contended for in that [Red-
dish] case, and the principle discussed was the same."'2' Reddish,
17. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Gowey, 30 Wash. 412, 424-29, 71 P. 12, 16-18 (1902);
Johnson v. Cook, 24 Wash. 474, 478-80, 64 P. 729, 731 (1901).
18. The courts explained that equity would step in when a forfeiture acted as a
penalty. McDaniels v. Gowey, 30 Wash. 412, 427, 71 P. 12, 16-18 (1902). The equitable
remedy for breach of contract is foreclosure by judicial sale. Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co.,
75 Wash. 490, 495, 135 P. 240, 242 (1913).
19. 12 Wash. 567, 41 P. 899 (1895).
20. Id. at 570-76, 41 P. -at 899-901. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
21. Pease, 12 Wash. at 573, 41 P. at 900.
22. Id. at 576, 41 P. at 901.
23. The court explained its decision to enforce the forfeiture provision by stating
that it had to enforce the terms of the contract, no matter how harsh, because "in the
absence of fraud [the contract] is conclusively presumed to speak the minds of the con-
tracting parties." Id. at 574-75, 41 P. at 901.
Later cases evince the confusion created by Pease and discuss the belief that a for-
feiture clause should not be enforced when the provision acts as a penalty, rather than as
a provision for liquidated damages. See supra note 16.
24. 10 Wash. 178, 38 P. 1003 (1894).
25. Pease, 12 Wash. at 570, 41 P. at 899-900.
26. Id. at 573, 41 P. at 900.
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however, was an action of ejectment, and the question before the
court was whether the seller could retain the payments received
prior to the forfeiture.2 7 The buyer was arguing that the forfei-
ture referred only to the contract and not to the payments
already received.2 8 The Reddish court did not discuss title, the
buyer's equitable interest, or foreclosure as an equitable remedy.
Justice Dunbar, therefore, erroneously relied on Reddish to
determine how a forfeiture clause affected the interest of a buyer
under a land installment contract.
After the Pease court determined that a forfeiture clause
created a contract of conditional sale, Washington courts held
repeatedly that executory contracts with forfeiture clauses con-
veyed no title to buyers.2 9 In 1925 Ashford v. Reese3" extended
the Pease holding to include all executory contracts. Thereafter,
executory contracts conveyed no title or real estate interest to
purchasers.31
In 1977 the Washington Supreme Court overruled Ashford
in Cascade Security Bank v. Butler32 and held that a buyer's
interest under a land installment contract is "real estate."' The
court made no distinction between contracts with or without for-
feiture clauses.3 4 Although Cascade reinstated the buyer's inter-
est as "real estate" and did not differentiate between contracts
with or without forfeiture clauses, the court failed to overrule
Pease and has continued to enforce forfeiture provisions."
27. Reddish, 10 Wash. at 182, 38 P. at 1005.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Everett v. Tiffany, 40 Wash. 2d 193, 200, 242 P.2d
169, 173 (1952) (because purchase was under a mortgage, purchasers had a homestead
right; however, if purchase had been under a contract with a forfeiture clause, no title
would have passed under an equitable mortgage theory); Churchill v. Ackerman, 22
Wash. 227, 231, 60 P. 406, 408 (1900) (no title passes under an executory land install-
ment contract).
30. 132 Wash. 649, 233 P. 29 (1925), overruled, Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 88
Wash. 2d 777, 780, 567 P.2d 631, 633 (1977).
31. See Ashford, 132 Wash. at 650, 233 P. at 30.
32. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 780, 567 P.2d 631, 633 (1977).
33. Id. at 782, 567 P.2d at 634.
34. The court's failure to differentiate between contracts with or without forfeiture
clauses probably results from the fact that most land installment contracts are written
on a standard form A-1964, or a similar form, which includes a forfeiture clause. Fal-
coner, Real Estate Contracts, 2 WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK § 37.46, stan-
dard form A-1964, at SU-37-25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 2 WASH. REAL PROP.
DESKBOOK].
35. Rains v. Lewis, 20 Wash. App. 117, 122, 579 P.2d 980, 983 (1978) (court enforced
forfeiture provision even though purchaser had the funds available three days after the
end of the grace period). See also Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 655-56, 604 P.2d
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Continued enforcement of forfeiture clauses may be a result
of the Cascade court's specific refusal to recognize the doctrine
of equitable conversion. 6 Equitable conversion treats the seller's
retained legal title as security for the unpaid purchase price,
while treating the lien as a mortgage.3 7 Consequently, the
buyer's interest becomes real property, and the seller's interest
becomes personal property.38 The seller's retained legal title
then acts as security for future payments by creating a vendor's
lien,39 an equitable right that permits the seller to enforce pay-
ment of the purchase price."0 Under a vendor's lien, the stan-
dard remedy for a buyer's default is foreclosure by judicial
sale."1
Despite the Cascade court's rejection of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, Washington courts have applied the doc-
trine's principles.'" In Freeborn v. Seattle Trust and Savings
Bank,' the Washington Supreme Court characterized the
seller's interest under a real estate contract as personal property
and the buyer's interest as real property when the seller retained
legal title to the property. The court's characterization of the
parties' respective property rights coincides with the parties'
504, 506 (1979) (when contract called for forfeiture if buyer sold the property without
seller's consent, and buyer contracted to sell the property, court indicated that it would
enforce forfeiture, if on remand, the lower court found that the alienation restriction was
reasonable).
36. Cascade, 88 Wash. 2d at 783-84, 567 P.2d at 634. The court explained that it did
not want to adopt the doctrine because it did not wish to "buttress the rationale" of the
cases with a fiction; the court would then be forced to make case-by-case determinations
of the boundaries of the doctrine. Id. at 784, 567 P.2d at 634.
37. For a complete discussion of the doctrine, see Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind.
226, 234-39, 301 N.E.2d 641, 646-49 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
38. Cascade, 88 Wash. 2d at 783, 567 P.2d at 634.
39. Id.
40. 3 AMERiCAN LAw OF PROPERY, supra note 6, § 11.73. By retaining legal title to
the property, the seller has retained an equitable right to the property. The seller holds
the legal title as security fdr future payments, even though the buyer has possession.
Thus, the seller not only has a lien against the buyer's equitable interest in the property,
but also has security for compelling future payments.
41. 77 AM. JuR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser § 415 (1975).
42. See, e.g., Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 655, 604 P.2d 504, 506 (1979) (com-
paring seller's retained title under the contract to a "security device" similar to a real
estate mortgage or a deed of trust).
Adherence to the principles of the doctrine of equitable conversion was forecast by
others after the Cascade decision, even though the Washington courts do not use the
term "doctrine of equitable conversion." Nock, Strait & Weaver, Equitable Conversion
in Washington: The Doctrine That Dares Not Speak Its Name, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 121, 138 (1977).
43. 94 Wash. 2d 336, 340, 617 P.2d 424, 426-27 (1980).
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rights under the doctrine of equitable conversion. Yet, despite
the application of some of the doctrine's principles, Washington
courts continue to refuse to apply the principles of foreclosure
by judicial sale to land installment contracts that contain forfei-
ture clauses.44
Equally confusing is the attitude of the Washington courts
regarding vendors' liens. For years, Washington courts refused
to recognize a vendor's lien."6 Recently, however, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court based its decision in In re Washburn46 on a
vendor's lien. In Washburn, the court created a fiction in order
to find that the purchasers had a vendor's lien. 47 After the pur-
chasers had taken possession of a house under an earnest money
agreement, they returned possession of the house to the sellers
before title passed. When the sellers failed to return the earnest
money according to a rescission agreement, the court held that
the purchasers had a vendor's lien on the property.48
The recognition of a vendor's lien in Washburn'may reflect
another step by the Washington Supreme Court towards
accepting foreclosure by judicial sale as an equitable remedy for
defaulting buyers. If the court accepts foreclosure as an equita-
ble remedy for defaulting buyers, the court should take the next
step and treat forfeiture clauses in land installment contracts as
provisions for liquidated damages. If that step is taken in cases
when forfeiture will act as a penalty and not as liquidated dam-
ages, the court can refuse to enforce the provision and can order
foreclosure of the property by judicial sale.
III. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL SALE INSTEAD OF FORFEITURE
A. The Case Against Forfeitures
When a defaulting buyer has a large equity in the property,
the loss under forfeiture is frequently disproportionate to the
44. See supra note 36.
45. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Chee Lumber Co., 128 Wash. 436, 442, 223 P. 12, 14 (1924);
Smith v. Allen, 18 Wash. 1, 6-7, 50 P. 783, 785 (1897).
46. 98 Wash. 2d 311, 654 P.2d 700 (1982).
47. Id. at 315, 654 P.2d at 702.
48. Id. The Washburn court distinguished the lien from the disallowed vendor's lien
in Smith v. Allen, 18 Wash. 1, 50 P. 783 (1897). Whereas the lien in Smith was a silent
lien based only on equitable principles, the lien in Washburn was a recorded judgment.
Thus, the lien did not offend the Washington recording statutes. Washburn, 98 Wash. at
313-15, 654 P.2d at 701-02.
1984]
92 University of Puget Sound Law Review
seller's damages.49 Although a forfeiture provision may seem fair
to the parties at the outset, the provision can become unfair as
time progresses50 because the buyer's potential losses from
default increase as the equity increases and as the buyer
improves the property.8 1
Regardless of the possible inequities, forfeiture provisions
are viewed as quick remedies for sellers with defaulting buyers
because of the traditional "time is of the essence" clause.52 This
clause allows the seller to declare the contract terminated upon
the buyer's default, to retake possession of the property without
legal process, and to retain all prior payments as liquidated
damages .5  Nevertheless, forfeiture clauses are not necessarily
speedy remedies today. Courts may delay enforcement by
allowing a grace period," and sellers usually must litigate to
quiet title or to eject the buyer. 5
The situation is complicated further because the grace peri-
ods often vary in length. Neither party can predict when the
grace period will begin, or how long it will last .5  Furthermore,
courts may allow the defaulting buyer to bring the contract up
to date during the grace period rather than requiring the buyer
to satisfy the entire contract;5 7 yet today's uncertain real estate
49. Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 232-33, 301 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974). See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
50..Note, Forfeiture Under Installment Land Contracts in Utah, 1981 UTAH L.
REV. 803, 816.
51. Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 906-07, 297 P.2d 605, 609 (1956). The court
cited Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) to explain
why additional improvements to the property required equity to step in to alleviate the
inequity created when the buyer had paid on a contract for six years and had only three
payments remaining at the time of default. The court explained that the more the buyer
paid toward the purchase price, the greater the buyer's loss would be under the forfei-
ture. As the buyer's loss increased, so did the inequity of a forfeiture.
52. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.25, at 80.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
55. Id. See also Tyler v. Casey, 115 Wash. 25, 28, 195 P. 1042, 1043 (1921).
56. 2 WASH. REAL PROP. DESKBOOK, supra note 34, § 37.38. Although thirty days is
the usual length of time, courts will sometimes allow less time if appropriate under the
circumstances. See supra note 4.
57. See, e.g., Dunbabin v. Allen Realty Co., 26 Wash. App. 660, 613 P.2d 570 (1980).
In Dunbabin, purchasers paid taxes due and raised the amount of the insurance in accor-
dance with the contract agreement during the grace period, and the court dismissed the
forfeiture proceedings. The court indicated that upon notice of intent to declare forfei-
ture, the purchaser automatically has a grace period, and that if the purchaser conforms
to the contract during that period, there can be no grounds for forfeiture. Id. at 667, 613
P.2d at 575. This complicates the seller's position, but does nothing to upset the law
that, if the purchaser fails to conform during the period, forfeiture results. Litigation
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market may prevent the buyer from marketing the property
before the end of the grace period. As a result, a buyer loses the
total investment through forfeiture.58 The seller, on the other
hand, usually has greater leverage because a larger equity in the
property allows the seller to market the property at a lower price
and still protect the equity. Forfeiture may disproportionately
burden the defaulting buyer and effectively defeat any incentive
for the seller to buy back the property at a fair price .5 Similarly,
the threat of forfeiture may discourage the buyer from maintain-
ing the property. Clearly, forfeiture fails to encourage an equita-
ble out-of-court settlement by the parties.
Current legal and recording practices also defeat the argu-
ment that forfeiture provides a speedy and inexpensive remedy
for a seller against a defaulting buyer.6 0 Nonetheless, sellers may
feel more protected by forfeiture clauses, particularly when the
buyer has a large equity in the property or when the property
has increased in value. In either situation, however, the buyer
may resell the property to a third party on another contract or
allow a third party to assume the original contract.61 The seller,
now usually dealing with an unknown buyer, can only hope that
the new buyer will maintain the property. Thus, the forfeiture
provision can defeat the seller's own reasons for including the
forfeiture clause while also disproportionately burdening the
defaulting buyer.
Washington courts have excused their failure to invalidate
forfeiture clauses, regardless of the inequities and inconsisten-
cies, on the theory that courts should not interfere with the par-
ties' right to contract.6 2 Washington courts have long accepted
seems to be the only way the seller may solidify his position.
58. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
59. This may not be true if the seller owes on underlying contracts. However, if the
buyer has a large equity in the property, the seller may view forfeiture as a windfall.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58. According to WASH. REv. CODE §
65.08.070 (1983), any conveyance of land that is not recorded is void against a subse-
quent purchaser or mortgagee.
61. The standard land installment contract form A-1964 does not include a "due on
sale" clause, which would require the contract to be paid in full if the purchaser sold to a
third party. 2 WASH. REAL PROP. DRSKBOOK, supra note 34, § 37.
62. See, e.g., Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 782, 215 P.2d 425,
428 (1950); Pease v. Baxter, 12 Wash. 567, 572, 41 P. 899, 900 (1895); CHG Int'l, Inc. v.
Robin Lee, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 512, 514-15, 667 P.2d 1127, 1129 (court refused to set
aside a condition precedent agreed to by the parties because the condition had not been
excused by action of the promisor, and because there had been no detrimental reliance
by the promisee), petition for review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1029 (1983).
1984]
94 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 8:85
that a seller, under a contract with a forfeiture provision, may
seek other remedies, including damages, when a buyer defaults."
However, the courts have failed to recognize that courts, too,
have options other than mere postponement of forfeiture
through the use of grace periods. Only with earnest money con-
tracts6 4  have the courts used a liquidated damages-penalty
analysis in deciding whether they will allow forfeiture of earnest
money as provided in the contract.5
Under earnest money contracts, the courts analyze forfei-
ture provisions on a liquidated damages theory. This enables the
courts to choose among three different remedies when the forfei-
ture provision would act as a penalty: rescission,6" damages,6 7 or
specific performance.6 8 If a court awards damages to the seller,
the court limits the recovery to the seller's actual damages, plus
any costs associated with the default.6
Courts have not explained the disparity in treatment
between earnest money contracts and land installment con-
tracts. The disparity may result from several factors that distin-
63. Hume, Real Estate Contracts and the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in
Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 233, 246 (1984). Even though a contract includes
a forfeiture clause, a seller's remedies include damages, specific performance, or collec-
tion of past due installments. Id. n.54.
64. An earnest money contract establishes the rights and liabilities of the con-
tracting parties prior to closing the sale. The earnest money contract ends at the closing
when the parties either pay the purchase price in full or enter into a separate agreement,
which is often an installment land contract. The seller usually retains legal title until the
buyer pays the full purchase price or enters into an executory land installment contract
for the balance. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.25, at 79.
65. See, e.g., Jenson v. Richens, 74 Wash. 2d 41, 47, 442 P.2d 636, 640 (1968) (forfei-
ture provision in earnest money contract that does not act as a penalty sets limit for
damages under a breach); Artz v. O'Bannon, 17 Wash. App. 421, 427-28, 562 P.2d 674,
677 (1977) (court enforced a forfeiture provision as liquidated damages when the amount
was reasonable and the purchaser failed to provide the required down payment under an
earnest money contract).
66. See, e.g., Miller v. Moulton, 77 Wash. 325, 328, 137 P. 491, 492 (1914) (when
parties rescind the contract, they relinquish any rights due under the contract, and both
parties are returned to their original positions).
67. See, e.g., Jenson v. Richens, 74 Wash. 2d 41, 47, 442 P.2d 636, 640 (1968) (when
contract includes a forfeiture provision, the court usually accepts this as a provision for
liquidated damages, thus limiting the amount of damages available to the seller upon the
buyer's default).
68. See, e.g., Russell v. Stephens, 191 Wash. 314, 71 P.2d 30 (1937) (seller can
choose to enforce a forfeiture provision or sue for the purchase price when buyer
defaults); Asia Inv. Co. v. Levin, 118 Wash. 620, 204 P. 808 (1922) (even though contract
included a forfeiture provision, that provision did not destroy seller's right to specific
performance).
69. See Artz v. O'Bannon, 17 Wash. App. 421, 427-28, 562 P.2d 674, 677 (1977).
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guish earnest money contracts and land installment contracts. In
an earnest money contract, the seller usually retains possession
of the property and does not convey title until the sale closes.70
Because the sale has not closed, the earnest money agreement is
viewed as a promise to contract, and the seller has not been
injured beyond costs and possible lost profits. 1 The distinctions
appear to be matters of form over substance. Buyers and sellers
are capable of establishing their own terms under both land
installment and earnest money contracts. However, the Wash-
ington courts have continually refused to invalidate the forfei-
ture provision under land installment contracts. In short, courts
do not limit the seller's recovery to the actual loss, but do limit
the buyer's equitable remedy to a grace period.72
B. Removing Inequitable Forfeiture Clauses
The Washington courts' failure to analyze the forfeiture
provision of a land installment contract under a liquidated dam-
ages theory contradicts established contract law, which enforces
liquidated damages provisions only when the parties could not
have easily or precisely ascertained possible future losses at the
time the parties contracted . By enforcing the forfeiture clause
in a land installment contract, a court effectively establishes the
previous payments and the property improvements as liquidated
damages.7 4 However, land installment contracts do not require
liquidated damages provisions because the fixed payments under
the contract terms enable both the courts and the parties to
ascertain easily and precisely the seller's loss at any time during
70. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.25, at 79.
71. Id.
72. The court's stance often results in an enforcement of forfeiture clauses that
ignores inequities. See, e.g., Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 297 P.2d 605 (1956) (pur-
chasers had paid 68% of the purchase price and had made substantial improvements to
the property, but the court would have enforced forfeiture if purchasers had been unable
to tender the balance of the contract price by the end of the thirty-day grace period);
Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) (purchasers had
paid nearly one-half of the contract price and had made improvements in the property,
thus, unless purchasers could pay the contract in full by the end of the grace period,
their losses would far outweigh sellers' losses).
73. J. Pomsmoy, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 433 (5th ed. 1941). See infra note 75.
74. Gooden v. Hunter, 56 Wash. 2d 617, 620, 355 P.2d 20, 23 (1960) (when there was
no forfeiture provision in a contract involving personal property, sellers were bound to
return any purchase money paid that was not necessary to compensate sellers for actual
damages).
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the life of the contract. 8 In fact, because forfeitures, can result in
recoveries that are disproportionate to the seller's loss, forfeit-
ures often defeat the purpose of liquidated damages by acting as
penalties rather than as compensation for sellers' actual losses.7 6
A forfeiture clause generally does not act as a penalty when
the defaulting buyer has little equity in the property or when
the buyer has absconded without attempting to cure the
default.77 However, the forfeiture will act as a penalty when a
buyer has made a large down payment at closing, when a buyer
has paid on the contract for several years, or when a buyer has
improved the property.7 8 Under forfeiture, such defaults usually
penalize the buyer. The severity of the penalty increases as the
seriousness of the breach decreases.7 '
When the Washington courts step in to alleviate the ineq-
uity of a stipulated penalty in a land installment contract, the
remedy does not remove the penalty; the grace period merely
postpones the penalty in most cases.80 Thus, the liquidated dam-
ages provision, which may have seemed fair at the outset, has
evolved into a harsh penalty.8"
C. The Preference for Foreclosure by Judicial Sale
Under foreclosure, the court orders the property sold,
according to statutory requirements, to satisfy the debt and the
costs of the foreclosure proceedings.82 Any excess from the sale
is paid to the buyer to protect the investment.8" Unless the
mortgage or a separate instrument includes an express agree-
75. Even as early as 1902, the Washington Supreme Court stated that a court can
easily compute the amount of the seller's injury when a buyer defaults under a land
installment contract. McDaniels v. Gowey, 30 Wash. 412, 425, 71 P. 12, 16 (1902).
76. See supra note 72.
77. Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 240-41, 301 N.E.2d 641, 650 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
78. Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 777, 784, 215 P.2d 425, 429
(1950).
79. Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16,
20-23, 230 P.2d 629, 632-33 (1951) (buyer should receive restitution for amount of down
payment that exceeds seller's damages).
80. See, e.g., Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 905, 297 P.2d 605, 608 (1956). Find-
ing the cash to pay off a contract, however, or even to bring the payments up to date,
may be difficult for a cash-poor buyer. Note, supra note 50, at 815.
81. Note, supra note 50, at 816.
82. 3 AamEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 11.74, at 186-87. See WASH. REv.
CODE ch. 61.12 (1983) (controlling foreclosure procedures).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.50 (1983).
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ment for payment of a particular sum of money upon default,
the mortgagee's (seller's) recovery is limited to the mortgaged
property.8 4 Prior to the judicial sale, a buyer may satisfy the
mortgage debt or the judgment.8 5 The buyer may also remain in
possession during the time prior to the sale. 6
The court may set a minimum or upset price for the prop-
erty,87 or it may conduct a hearing to establish the fair market
value of the property to be credited to the foreclosure judgment
upon application for the confirmation of a sale.88 The seller may
not receive a deficiency judgment if the fair market value would
discharge the mortgage debt.89
If the contract contains an express agreement for the pay-
ment of a specific sum of money, the court can decree a defi-
ciency judgment, to be satisfied by any other property of the
mortgagor debtor. 90 If the contract does not contain an express
agreement, the seller may first receive a personal judgment for
the overdue payments that the debtor's other property can sat-
isfy.91 Consequently, the seller has some protection against prop-
erty that has lost value, even without a deficiency judgment.
Although a judicial sale may result in a lower selling price, the
foreclosure process offers equitable protection to the seller and
does not enforce a harsh penalty against the defaulting buyer.
Under foreclosure by judicial sale, the buyer's right to
excess proceeds allows compensation for increased property
value, for property improvements, and for a buyer's large
equity.92 Foreclosure also protects the buyer by allowing rein-
statement of the contract during the notice period or redemp-
tion of the property during the redemption period.93 Further-
more, because foreclosure by judicial sale tends to equalize the
positions of buyer and seller, foreclosure encourages both parties
84. Id.
85. Id. § 61.12.060.
86. Id. § 6.04.130.
87. Id. § 61.12.060.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 61.12.070.
91. Stevens v. Irwin, 132 Wash. 289, 294, 231 P. 783, 785 (1925).
92. Because contract law acknowledges that the buyer assumes the risk of loss once
he has taken possession of the property, the buyer should be liable for any decrease in
value or should receive the benefit of an increase in value. Lichty, Rights and Estates of
Vendor and Vendee Under an Executory Contract for the Sale of Real Property, 1
WASH. L. REV. 9, 12 (1925).
93. Note, supra note 50, at 829.
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to resolve the default outside of the courtroom.
Foreclosure has many benefits. Not only does foreclosure
promote equitable remedies for both parties under a buyer's
default, but it also encourages defaulting buyers to maintain the
property during the default period and acts as an incentive for
out-of-court settlements. Above all, foreclosure prevents the for-
feitures that equity abhors.
IV. MITIGATION OF FORFEITURES IN OTHER STATES
By adopting foreclosure as an equitable remedy, Washing-
ton would join the modern trend. Some state legislatures have
dealt with forfeiture.9 6 Maryland, for instance, prohibits forfei-
tures of installment land contracts involving the sale of residen-
tial property to a noncorporate buyer and requires foreclosure
by judicial sale upon a purchaser's default.9 6 A few legislatures
have set a threshold percentage. 7 For example, Ohio requires
foreclosure when the buyer has paid at least twenty percent of
the contract price or when the buyer has paid on the contract
for five years or more.98 Maryland sets forty percent as the
94. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.28, at 95.
95. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741 to -749 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (statutory
grace periods of thirty days to nine months determined by percentage of purchase price
paid at time of default); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-24 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983) (court
may foreclose liens and mortgages by judicial sale rather than by strict foreclosure); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 697.01 (West 1969 & Supp. 1983) (all conveyances of real property are
deemed mortgages subject to rules of foreclosure); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 656.1-.6 (West
1950 & Supp. 1983) (thirty-day statutory notice [grace] period required before forfei-
ture); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3101, .3155, .5741 (1968 & Supp. 1984-1985) (court
has jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage of real estate and land contracts; court can set
minimum sale price at forfeiture or foreclosure sale; court can set amount of restitution
[redemption price] owed to seller); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West 1947 & Supp. 1984)
(length of statutory notice (grace] period dependent upon percentage of purchase price
paid); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-104 (1983) (defaulting buyer may be relieved of forfei-
ture upon making full compensation unless buyer was grossly negligent, willful, or fraud-
ulent); N.D. CENrr. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to -06 (1976 & Supp. 1983) (six-month notice period
required upon default if more than two-thirds of outstanding balance owed; in all other
cases one-year notice period required); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 1960 &
Supp. 1983-1984) (all mortgages must be judicially foreclosed); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 11A (West Supp. 1983-1984) (all contracts for real property treated as mortgages); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-50-1 (1979 & Supp. 1983) (judicial foreclosure available upon
default of executory contract for sale of real property).
96. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -108 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
97. If the statutory percentage of the contract has been paid by the buyer, the court
will not enforce the forfeiture clause and will foreclose the contract by judicial sale as a
mortgage. The threshold percentage is often different than the break-even point, the
point where the seller will suffer no damage. Note, supra note 50, at 817 n.105.
98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.01-.10 (Page 1981). See also Note, Installment
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threshold percentage.9 9 California allows either party to request
a foreclosure after the buyer has paid three percent.100
Oklahoma simply treats all installment land contracts as
mortgages. 0 1
Numerous states, however, leave forfeiture clauses to the
courts,' 0 ' and some of these courts order foreclosure by judicial
Land Contract-Forfeiture Clause Held Invalid-Seller's Remedy for Breach of the
Contract Is to Obtain a Judicial Sale of the Property-Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S. W.2d
381 (Ky. 1979), 7 N. Ky. L. REv. 303, 309 (1980).
99. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-105 (1981).
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1675 (West Supp. 1984). See also Note, supra note 50, at 817
n.103.
101. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.27, at 84. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 11A
(West Supp. 1983-1984).
102. G. OsBoRNE, supra note 2, § 3.28, at 95. Some courts have refused to enforce
inequitable forfeitures. See, e.g., Strack v. Miller, 645 P.2d 184, 187 (Alaska 1982) (when
equity and justice so require, court may refuse to enforce an express forfeiture provision
in a land installment contract); Woods v. Monticello Dev. Co., 656 P.2d 1324, 1326 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1982) (defaulting buyer may be entitled to redeem if trial court determines
equities so warrant); Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 505-06, 435 A.2d 1022,
1025-26 (1980) (purchaser has equitable claim for restitution to prevent unjust enrich-
ment and to avoid forfeiture); Clements v. Castle Mortgage Serv. Co., 382 A.2d 1367,
1370-71 (Del. Ch. 1977) (court may prevent a forfeiture when equity requires); Kaiman
Realty v. Carmichael, - Hawaii -, -, 659 P.2d 63, 64 (1983) (inequitable forfeiture
of purchaser's equitable ownership prohibited); Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 555-
56, 394 P.2d 630, 633 (1964) (if contract damages bear no reasonable relation to actual
damages, provision is an unenforceable penalty); Mustard v. Sugar Valley Lakes, 7 Kan.
App. 2d 340, 342, 642 P.2d 111, 112 (1981) (equitable foreclosure permitted when forfei-
ture inequitable); Maxey v. Glindmeyer, 379 So. 2d 297, 301 (Miss. 1980) (court referred
to Uniform Commercial Code and equated forfeiture provision in land sales contract to a
liquidated damages provision, limiting seller's recovery to actual damages); Ryan v.
Kolterman, 215 Neb. 355, -, 338 N.W.2d 747, 749 (1983) (forfeiture treated as strict
foreclosure and permitted only when property value is less than the amount owed on
contract); Long v. Towne, 98 Nev. 11, 13-14, 639 P.2d 528, 530 (1982) (court decisions
imply that a lien foreclosure sale is an equitable alternative to forfeiture); Newcomb v.
Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 467-68, 114 A.2d 882, 884-85 (1955) (defaulting purchaser entitled to
excess of payments beyond seller's actual harm); Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquer-
que Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 102, 654 P.2d 548, 555 (1982) (court may refuse to
enforce a forfeiture provision when results would be harsh and inequitable); Bean v.
Walker, 95 A.D.2d 70, 74-75, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (1983) (purchaser holds equitable
title, and seller has a vendor's lien; equity should intervene if forfeiture would result in
inequitable disposition of property and exorbitant monetary loss); Brannock v. Fletcher,
271 N.C. 65, 70, 155 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1967) (relation between vendor and vendee in exec-
utory agreement for sale of land is substantially that subsisting between mortgagee and
mortgagor and is governed by same general rules); Economy Sav. & Loan Co. v. Holling-
ton, 105 Ohio App. 243, 248-50, 152 N.E.2d 125, 130-31 (1957) (court will not enforce a
forfeiture provision in land contracts if forfeiture would act as a penalty); Braunstein v.
Trottier, 54 Or. App. 687, 691-94, 635 P.2d 1379, 1381-83 (1981) (court reviewed tangled
history of enforcement of forfeiture provisions in land sale contracts), petition for review
denied, 292 Or. 568, 644 P.2d 1129 (1982); Anderson Contracting Co. v. Daugherty, 274
Pa. Super. 13, 22, 417 A.2d 1227, 1232 (1979) (purchaser's rights under land installment
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sale under a mortgage theory."' 3 In 1973 the Indiana Supreme
Court decided the leading case of Skendzel v. Marshall.1 " Since
then, Indiana courts have applied mortgage law to installment
land contracts when a buyer defaults under a forfeiture provi-
sion if the forfeiture would act as a penalty rather than as liqui-
dated damages. In Skendzel, the seller retained title under a
land installment contract that included a forfeiture clause, and
the defaulting buyer paid $21,000 of the $36,000 contract
price.10 5 The court decided three basic issues: the forfeiture
clause was a provision for liquidated damages; a forfeiture would
cause the buyer to suffer a loss totally disproportionate to the
seller's actual loss; and the liquidated damages provision acted
as a penalty because the exact compensation could be computed
easily at the time of the default. 10 6 The court held that the for-
feiture clause was therefore unenforceable as a penalty. 0 7
The Skendzel court applied mortgage law to the contract
and treated the retained title as security for the debt. 08 The
seller's interest created a vendor's lien that the court could
enforce either through forfeiture or through foreclosure. 09
Because the defaulting buyer had a large equity in the property,
the court ordered foreclosure by judicial sale as the preferable
and equitable remedy, even though the contract included a for-
feiture clause. °10
Other jurisdictions have applied the equitable mortgage the-
ory to land installment contracts with forfeiture clauses. In 1979
the Kentucky Supreme Court applied the Skendzel reasoning in
a similar situation."' The Kentucky court held that there is no
contract are those of mortgagor, requiring foreclosure instead of forfeiture), appeal dis-
missed, 492 Pa. 630, 425 A.2d 329 (1980); De Leon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965) (restitution permitted when purchaser's payments exceed seller's actual
losses); Stonebraker v. Zinn, 286 S.E.2d 911, 914-15 (W. Va. 1982) (court refused to
equate land installment contracts to equitable mortgages, but liquidated damages clauses
unenforceable as penalties if contract damages far exceed actual damages); Schwartz v.
Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 532-33, 59 N.W.2d 489, 492-93 (1953) (seller must repay payments
that exceed seller's loss), overruled on other grounds, Stuesser v. Ebel, 19 Wis. 2d 591,
597, 120 N.W.2d 679, 682-83 (1963).
103. G. OSBORNE, supra note 2, § 3.28, at 95.
104. 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
105. Id. at 228-30, 301 N.E.2d at 643.
106. Id. at 231-34, 301 N.E.2d at 644-46.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 234-41, 301 N.E.2d at 646-50.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 240-41, 301 N.E.2d at 650.
111. Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979) (the court refused to enforce a
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practical difference between a mortgage and an installment land
contract, and reversed an appellate court's ruling in favor of for-
feiture. In California the cases clearly reflect the recognition that
installment land contracts should be treated as security under
mortgage law.112 Florida courts have compared the seller's posi-
tion to a mortgagee's position and have foreclosed installment
land contracts.1
Although statutory threshold percentages may provide guid-
ance for courts, the Skendzel approach gives courts more
flexibility by allowing them to determine when foreclosure by
judicial sale is the more equitable remedy for both parties. In
situations where the parties are unable to resolve the default by
an out-of-court agreement, Washington courts could follow
Skendzel and order foreclosure by judicial sale. This would pre-
vent liquidated damages from creating a penalty for the default-
ing buyer under a land installment contract.
V. CONCLUSION
-The time has come for Washington courts to recognize that
they have a choice of equitable remedies: grace periods and fore-
closure by judicial sale. Washington courts have lived with Pease
v. Baxter"4 and its progeny far too long; a forfeiture clause
should not remove the right to foreclosure. Cascade Security
Bank v. Butler'1 5 reestablished the buyer's interest as real prop-
erty and removed the obstacle preventing foreclosure as an equi-
table remedy. In re Washburn e recognized the vendor's lien as
a part of Washington law. The next step is for the courts to real-
ize that foreclosure by judicial sale constitutes a viable, equita-
ble remedy.
forfeiture provision and ordered a foreclosure by judicial sale, analogizing land install-
ment contracts to mortgages). See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the Skendzel case.
112. See, e.g., Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 801, 803-04, 415
P.2d 833, 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1966) (penalties and forfeitures are denied in Califor-
nia when a buyer defaults; instead, the seller receives actual damages and the buyer
receives any excess); Williams Plumbing Co. v. Sinsley, 53 Cal. App. 1027, 1033, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 349 (1976) (court viewed land installment contracts with security devices as
similar to mortgages and did not enforce a forfeiture for late payment).
113. See H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. App. 1972) (when buyer
defaulted, court ordered foreclosure of the property by judicial sale, equating the parties'
rights to those under a mortgage). See also Note, supra note 98, at 309-10.
114. 12 Wash. 567, 41 P. 899 (1895).
115. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
116. 98 Wash. 2d 311, 654 P.2d 700 (1982).
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Washington courts can treat defaulting buyers under land
installment contracts with forfeiture clauses far more equitably.
If enforcement of the forfeiture provision would create a dispro-
portionate loss to the buyer, the court should view the forfeiture
clause as a provision for liquidated damages that is a penalty.
The court should refuse to enforce the forfeiture provision and
should order foreclosure by judicial sale.
Donna R. Roper
